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ABSTRACT
Recent works show that Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are highly
non-robust with respect to adversarial attacks on both the graph
structure and the node attributes, making their outcomes unreliable.
We propose the first method for certifiable (non-)robustness of
graph convolutional networks with respect to perturbations of the
node attributes1. We consider the case of binary node attributes
(e.g. bag-of-words) and perturbations that are L0-bounded. If a node
has been certified with our method, it is guaranteed to be robust
under any possible perturbation given the attack model. Likewise,
we can certify non-robustness. Finally, we propose a robust semi-
supervised training procedure that treats the labeled and unlabeled
nodes jointly. As shown in our experimental evaluation, our method
significantly improves the robustness of the GNNwith onlyminimal
effect on the predictive accuracy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Graph data is the core for many high impact applications rang-
ing from the analysis of social networks, over gene interaction
networks, to interlinked document collections. One of the most
frequently applied tasks on graph data is node classification: given
a single large (attributed) graph and the class labels of a few nodes,
the goal is to predict the labels of the remaining nodes. Applica-
tions include the classification of proteins in interaction graphs
[9], prediction of customer types in e-commerce networks [6], or
the assignment of scientific papers from a citation network into
topics [12]. While there exist many classical approaches to node
classification [2, 15], recently graph neural networks (GNNs), also
called graph convolutional networks, have gained much attention
and improved the state of the art in node classification [5, 7, 12, 13].
However, there is one big catch: Recently it has been shown that
such approaches are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [4, 21, 22]:
1Code available at https://www.kdd.in.tum.de/robust-gcn
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Even only slight deliberate perturbations of the nodes’ features
or the graph structure can lead to completely wrong predictions.
Such negative results significantly hinder the applicability of these
models. The results become unreliable and such problems open the
door for attackers that can exploit these vulnerabilities.
So far, no effective mechanisms are available, which (i) prevent
that small changes to the data lead to completely different predic-
tions in a GNN, or (ii) that can verify whether a given GNN is robust
w.r.t. specific perturbation model. This is critical, since especially
in domains where graph-based learning is used (e.g. the Web) ad-
versaries are omnipresent, e.g., manipulating online reviews and
product websites [11]. One of the core challenges is that in a GNN
a node’s prediction is also affected when perturbing other nodes in
the graph – making the space of possible perturbations large. How
to make sure that small changes to the input data do not have a
dramatic effect to a GNN?
In this work, we shed light on this problem by proposing the
first method for provable robustness of GNNs. More precisely, we
focus on graph convolutional networks and potential perturbations
of the node attributes, where we provide:
1) Certificates: Given a trained GNN, we can give robustness cer-
tificates that state that a node is robust w.r.t. a certain space of
perturbations. If the certificate holds, it is guaranteed that no per-
turbation (in the considered space) exists which will change the
node’s prediction. Furthermore, we also provide non-robustness
certificates that, when they hold, state whether a node is not
robust; realized by providing an adversarial example.
2) Robust Training: We propose a learning principle that improves
the robustness of the GNN (i.e. making it less sensitive to pertur-
bations) while still ensuring high accuracy for node classification.
Specifically, we exploit the semi-supervised nature of the GNN
learning task, thus, taking also the unlabeled nodes into account.
In contrast to existing works on provable robustness for classical
neural networks/robust training (e.g. [10, 18, 20]), we tackle various
additional challenges: Being the first work for graphs, we have to
deal with perturbations of multiple instances simultaneously. For
this, we introduce a novel space of perturbations where the pertur-
bation budget is constrained locally and globally. Moreover, since
the considered data domains are often discrete/binary attributes,
we tackle challenging L0 constraints on the perturbations. Lastly,
we exploit a crucial aspect of semi-supervised learning by taking
also the unlabeled nodes into account for robust training.
The key idea we will exploit in our work is to estimate the worst-
case change in the predictions obtained by the GNN under the
space of perturbations. If the worst possible change is small, the
GNN is robust. Since, however, this worst-case cannot be computed
efficiently, we provide bounds on this value, providing conservative
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estimates. More technically, we derive relaxations of the GNN and
the perturbations space, enabling efficient computation.
Besides the two core technical contributions mentioned above,
we further perform extensive experiments:
3) Experiments: We show on various graph datasets that GNNs
trained in the traditional way are not robust, i.e. only few of
the nodes can be certified to be robust, respectively many are
certifiably non-robust even with small perturbation budgets. In
contrast, using our robust training we can dramatically improve
robustness increasing it by in some cases by factor of four.
Overall, using our method, significantly improves the reliability of
GNNs, thus, being highly beneficial when, e.g., using them in real
production systems or scientific applications.
2 RELATEDWORK
The sensitivity of machine learning models w.r.t. adversarial pertur-
bations has been studied extensively [8] . Only recently, however,
researchers have started to investigate adversarial attacks on graph
neural networks [4, 21, 22] and node embeddings [1]. All of these
works focus on generating adversarial examples. In contrast, we
provide the first work to certify and improve the robustness of
GNNs. As shown in [21], both perturbations to the node attributes
as well as the graph structure are harmful. In this work, we fo-
cus on perturbations of the node attributes and we leave structure
perturbations for future work.
For ‘classical’ neural networks various heuristic approaches have
been proposed to improve the the robustness to adversarial exam-
ples [17]. However, such heuristics are often broken by new attack
methods, leading to an arms race. As an alternative, recent works
have considered certifiable robustness [3, 10, 18, 20] providing guar-
antees that no perturbation w.r.t. a specific perturbation space will
change an instance’s prediction.
For this work, specifically the class of methods based on convex
relaxations are of relevance [18, 20]. They construct a convex re-
laxation for computing a lower bound on the worst-case margin
achievable over all possible perturbations. This bound serves as a
certificate of robustness. Solving such convex optimization prob-
lems can often been done efficiently, and by exploiting duality it
enables to even train a robust model [20]. As already mentioned,
our work differs significantly from the existing methods since (i)
it considers the novel GNN domain with its relational dependen-
cies, (ii) it handles a discrete/binary data domain, while existing
works have only handled continuous data; thus also leading to
very different constraints on the perturbations, and (iii) we propose
a novel robust training procedure which specifically exploits the
semi-supervised learning setting of GNNs, i.e. using the unlabeled
nodes as well.
3 PRELIMINARIES
We consider the task of (semi-supervised) node classification in
a single large graph having binary node features. Let G = (A,X )
be an attributed graph, where A ∈ {0, 1}N×N is the adjacency
matrix and X ∈ {0, 1}N×D represents the nodes’ features. W.l.o.g.
we assume the node-ids to be V = {1, . . . ,N }. Given a subset
VL ⊆ V of labeled nodes, with class labels from C = {1, 2, . . . ,K},
the goal of node classification is to learn a function f : V → C
which maps each node v ∈ V to one class in C. In this work, we
focus on node classification employing graph neural networks. In
particular, we consider graph convolutional networks where the
latent representations H (l ) at layer l are of the form
H (l ) = σ (l )
(
Aˆ
(l−1)
H (l−1)W (l−1) + b(l−1)
)
for l = 2, ...,L (1)
where H (1) = X and with activation functions given by
σ (L) (·) = softmax (·) , σ (l ) (·) = ReLU (·) for l = 2, ...,L − 1.
The output H (L)vc denotes the probability of assigning node v to
class c . The Aˆ(l ) are the message passing matrices that define how
the activations are propagated in the network. In GCN [12], for
example, Aˆ(1) = ... = Aˆ(L−1) = D˜− 12 A˜D˜− 12 , where A˜ = A + IN×N
and D˜ii =
∑
j A˜i j . TheW (.) and b(.) are the trainable weights of
the graph neural network, usually simply learned by minimizing
the cross-entropy loss on the given labeled training nodesVL .
Notations: We denote with Nl (t) the l-hop neighborhood of a
node t , i.e. all nodes which are reachable with l hops (or less) from
node t , including the node t itself. Given a matrix X , we denote its
positive part with [X ]+ = max(X , 0)where themax is applied entry-
wise. Similarly, the negative part is [X ]− = −min(X , 0), which
are non-negative numbers. All matrix norms | |X | |p used in the
paper are meant to be entry-wise, i.e. flattening X to a vector and
applying the corresponding vector norm. We denote with h(l ) the
dimensionality of the latent space in layer l , i.e.H (l ) ∈ RN×h(l ) . Xi :
denotes the i-th row of a matrix X and X:j its j-th column.
4 CERTIFYING ROBUSTNESS FOR GRAPH
CONVOLUTIONAL NETWORKS
Our first goal is to derive an efficient principle for robustness cer-
tificates. That is, given an already trained GNN and a specific node
t under consideration (called target node), our goal is to provide a
certificate which guarantees that the prediction made for node t will
not change even if the data gets perturbed (given a specific pertur-
bation budget). That is, if the certificate is provided, the prediction
for this node is robust under any admissible perturbations. Unlike
existing works, we cannot restrict perturbations to the instance
itself due to the relational dependencies.
However, we can exploit one key insight: for a GNN with L
layers, the output H (L)t : of node t depends only on the nodes in its
L − 1 hop neighborhood NL−1(t). Therefore, instead of operating
with Eq. (1), we can ‘slice’ the matrices X and Aˆ(l ) at each step to
only contain the entries that are required to compute the output
for the target node t .2 This step drastically improves scalability
– reducing not only the size of the neural network but also the
potential perturbations we have to consider later on. We define the
matrix slices for a given target t as follows:3
ÛA(l ) = Aˆ(l )NL−l (t ),NL−l+1(t ) for l = 1, ...,L − 1, ÛX = XNL−1(t ): (2)
where the set indexing corresponds to slicing the rows and columns
of a matrix, i.e. AˆN2(t ),N1(t ) contains the rows corresponding to the
2Note that the shapes ofW and b do not change.
3To avoid clutter in the notation, since our method certifies robustness with respect to
a specific node t , we omit explicitly mentioning the target node t in the following.
two-hop neighbors of node t and the columns corresponding to its
one-hop neighbors. As it becomes clear, for increasing l (i.e. depth
in the network), the slices of Aˆ(l ) become smaller, and at the final
step we only need the target node’s one-hop neighbors.
Overall, we only need to consider the following sliced GNN:
Hˆ
(l )
= ÛA(l−1)H (l−1)W (l−1) + b(l−1) for l = 2, ...,L (3)
H (l )nj = max
{
Hˆ
(l )
nj , 0
}
for l = 2, ...,L − 1 (4)
and H (1) = ÛX . Here, we replaced the ReLU activation by its ana-
lytical form, and we denoted with Hˆ (l ) the input before applying
the ReLU, and with H (l ) the corresponding output. Note that the
matrices are getting smaller in size – with Hˆ (L) actually reducing
to a vector that represents the predicted log probabilities (logits)
for node t only. Note that we also omitted the softmax activation
function in the final layer L since for the final classification decision
it is sufficient to consider the largest value of Hˆ (L). Overall, we
denote the output of this sliced GNN as f tθ ( ÛX , ÛA) = Hˆ
(L) ∈ RK .
Here θ is the set of all parameters, i.e. θ = {W (·),b(·)}.
4.1 Robustness Certificates for GNNs
Given this set-up, we are now ready to define our actual task: We
aim to verify whether no admissible perturbation changes the pre-
diction of the target node t . Formally we aim to solve:
Problem 1. Given a graph G, a target node t , and an GNN with
parameters θ . Let y∗ denote the class of node t (e.g. given by the
ground truth or predicted). The worst case margin between classes y∗
and y achievable under some setXq,Q ( ÛX ) of admissible perturbations
to the node attributes is given by
mt (y∗,y) := minimize
X˜
f tθ (X˜ , ÛA)y∗ − f tθ (X˜ , ÛA)y (5)
subject to X˜ ∈ Xq,Q ( ÛX )
Ifmt (y∗,y) > 0 for all y , y∗, the GNN is certifiably robust w.r.t.
node t and Xq,Q .
If the minimum in Eq. (5) is positive, it means that there exists no
adversarial example (within our defined admissible perturbations)
that leads to the classifier changing its prediction to the other class
y – i.e. the logits of class y∗ are always larger than the one of y.
Setting reasonable constraints to adversarial attacks is important
to obtain certificates that reflect realistic attacks. Works for classical
neural networks have constrained the adversarial examples to lie
on a small ϵ-ball around the original sample measured by, e.g., the
infinity-norm or L2-norm [3, 18, 20], often e.g. ϵ < 0.1 This is
clearly not practical in our binary setting as an ϵ < 1 would mean
that no attribute can be changed. To allow reasonable perturbations
in a binary/discrete setting one has to allow much larger changes
than the ϵ-balls considered so far.
Therefore, motivated by the existingworks on adversarial attacks
to graphs [21], we consider a more realistic scenario: We define the
set of admissible perturbations by limiting the number of changes to
the original attributes – i.e. we assume a perturbation budgetQ ∈ N
and measure the L0 norm in the change to ÛX . It is important to note
that in a graph setting an adversary can attack the target node by
also changing the node attributes of its L − 1 hop neighborhood.
Thus, Q acts as a global perturbation budget.
However, since changing many attributes for a single node might
not be desired, we also allow to limit the number of perturbations
locally – i.e. for each node in the L − 1 hop neighborhood we can
consider a budget of q ∈ N. Overall, in this work we consider
admissible perturbations of the form:
Xq,Q ( ÛX ) =
{
X˜
 X˜nj ∈ {0, 1} ∧ ∥X˜ − ÛX ∥0 ≤ Q (6)
∧ ∥X˜n: − ÛXn:∥0 ≤ q ∀n ∈ NL−1
}
.
Challenges: There are two major obstacles preventing us from
efficiently finding the minimum in Eq. (5). First, our data domain is
discrete, making optimization often intractable. Second, our func-
tion (i.e. the GNN) f tθ is nonconvex due to the nonlinear activation
functions in the neural network. But there is hope: As we will show,
we can efficiently find lower bounds on the minimum of the orig-
inal problem by performing specific relaxations of (i) the neural
network, and (ii) the data domain. This means that if the lower
bound is positive, we are certain that our classifier is robust w.r.t.
the set of admissible perturbations. Remarkably, we will even see
that our relaxation has an optimal solution which is integral. That
is, we obtain an optimal solution (i.e. perturbation) which is binary
– thus, we can effectively handle the discrete data domain.
4.2 Convex Relaxations
To make the objective function in Eq. (5) convex, we have to find
a convex relaxation of the ReLU activation function. While there
are many ways to achieve this, we follow the approach of [20] in
this work. The core idea is (i) to treat the matrices H (·) and Hˆ (·)
in Eqs. (3,4) no longer as deterministic but as variables one can
optimize over (besides optimizing over X˜ ). In this view, Eqs. (3,4)
become constraints the variables have to fulfill. Then, (ii) we relax
the non-linear ReLU constraint of Eq. (4) by a set of convex ones.
In detail: Consider Eq. (4). Here, Hˆ (l )nj denotes the input to the
ReLU activation function. Let us assume we have given some lower
bounds R(l )nj and upper bounds S
(l )
nj on this input based on the pos-
sible perturbations (in Section 4.5 we will discuss how to find these
bounds). We denote with I(l ) the set of all tuples (n, j) in layer
l for which the lower and upper bounds differ in their sign, i.e.
R(l )nj < 0 < S
(l )
nj . We denote with I
(l )
+ and I(l )− the tuples where both
bounds are non-negative and non-positive, respectively.
Consider the case I(l ): We relax Eq. (4) using a convex envelope:
H (l )nj ≥ Hˆ
(l )
nj , H
(l )
nj ≥ 0,
H (l )nj
(
S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj
)
≤ S(l )nj
(
Hˆ
(l )
nj − R(l )nj
)
if (n, j) ∈ I(l )
R 0 S
H
Hˆ
The idea is illustrated in the figure
on the right. Note that H (l )nj is no
longer the deterministic output of
the ReLU given its input but it is a
variable. For a given input, the vari-
able is constrained to lie on a vertical
line above the input and below the
upper line of the envelope.
Accordingly, but more simply, for the cases I(l )+ and I(l )− we get:
H (l )nj = Hˆ
(l )
nj if (n, j) ∈ I(l )+ H (l )nj = 0 if (n, j) ∈ I(l )−
which are actually not relaxations but exact conditions. Overall,
Eq. (4) has now been replaced by a set of linear (i.e. convex) con-
straints. Together with the linear constraints of Eq. (3) they deter-
mine the set of admissible H (·) and Hˆ (·) we can optimize over. We
denote the collection of these matrices that fulfill these constraints
byZq,Q (X˜ ). Note that this set depends on X˜ since H (1) = X˜ .
Overall, our problem becomes:
m˜t (y∗,y) := minimize
X˜ ,H (·),Hˆ (·)
Hˆ
(L)
y∗ − Hˆ
(L)
y = c
⊤Hˆ (L) (7)
subject to X˜ ∈ Xq,Q ( ÛX ) , [H (·), Hˆ (·)] ∈ Zq,Q (X˜ )
Here we introduced the constant vector c = ey∗ − ey , which is 1
at position y∗, −1 at y, and 0 else. This notation clearly shows that
the objective function is a simple linear function.
Corollary 4.1. The minimum in Eq. (7) is a lower bound on the
minimum of the problem in Eq. (5), i.e. m˜t (y∗,y) ≤ mt (y∗,y).
Proof. Let X˜ be the perturbation obtained by Problem 1, and
[H (·), Hˆ (·)] the resulting exact representations based on Eq. (3)+(4).
By construction, [H (·), Hˆ (·)] ∈ Zq,Q ( ÛX ). Since Eq. (7) optimizes
over the full setZq,Q ( ÛX ) its minimum can not be larger. □
From Corollary 4.1 it follows that if m˜t (y∗,y) > 0 for all y , y∗,
the GNN is robust at node t . Directly solving Eq. (7), however, is
still intractable due to the discrete data domain.
As one core contribution, we will show that we can find the
optimal solution in a tractable way. We proceed in two steps: (i) We
first find a suitable continuous, convex relaxation of the discrete
domain of possible adversarial examples. (ii) We show that the
relaxed problem has an optimal solution which is integral; thus, by
our specific construction the solution is binary.
More precisely, we relax the set Xq,Q ( ÛX ) to:
Xˆq,Q ( ÛX ) =
{
X˜
 X˜nj ∈ [0, 1] ∧ ∥X˜ − ÛX ∥1 ≤ Q (8)
∧ ∥X˜n: − ÛXn:∥1 ≤ q ∀n ∈ NL−1
}
Note that the entries of X˜ are now continuous between 0 and 1,
and we have replaced the L0 norm with the L1 norm. This leads to:
mˆt (y∗,y) := minimize
X˜ ,H (·),Hˆ (·)
Hˆ
(L)
y∗ − Hˆ
(L)
y = c
⊤Hˆ (L) (9)
subject to X˜ ∈ Xˆq,Q ( ÛX ) , [H (·), Hˆ (·)] ∈ Zq,Q (X˜ )
It is worth mentioning that Eq. (9) is a linear problem since besides
the linear objective function also all constraints are linear. We
provide the explicit form of this linear program in the appendix.
Accordingly, Eq. (9) can be solved optimally in a tractable way. Since
Xˆq,Q ( ÛX ) ⊃ Xq,Q ( ÛX ) , we trivially have mˆt (y∗,y) ≤ m˜t (y∗,y). But
even more, we obtain:
Theorem 4.2. The minimum in Eq. (7) is equal to the minimum
in Eq. (9), i.e. m˜t (y∗,y) = mˆt (y∗,y).
We will proof this theorem later (see Sec. 4.4) since it requires
some further results. In summary, using Theorem 4.2, we can indeed
handle the discrete data domain/discrete perturbations exactly and
tractably by simply solving Eq. (9) instead of Eq. (7).
4.3 Efficient Lower Bounds via the Dual
In order to provide a robustness guarantee w.r.t. the perturbations
on ÛX , we have to find the minimum of the linear program in Eq. (9)
to ensure that we have covered the worst case. While it is possible
to solve linear programs ‘efficiently’ using highly optimized linear
program solvers, the potentially large number of variables in a GNN
makes this approach rather slow. As an alternative, we can consider
the dual of the linear program [20]. There, any dual-feasible solution
is a lower bound on the minimum of the primal problem. That is, if
we find any dual-feasible solution for which the objective function
of the dual is positive, we know that the minimum of the primal
problem has to be positive as well, guaranteeing robustness of the
GNN w.r.t. any perturbation in the set.
Theorem 4.3. The dual of Eq. (9) is equivalent to:
maximize
Ω,η,ρ
дtq,Q
( ÛX ,c,Ω,η, ρ) (10)
subject to
Ω(l ) ∈ [0, 1] |NL−l |×h(l ) for l = L − 1, ..., 2,
η ∈ R |NL−1 |≥0 , ρ ∈ R≥0
where
дtq,Q (...) =
L−1∑
l=2
∑
(n, j)∈I(l )
S(l )njR
(l )
nj
S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
+
−
L−1∑
l=1
1⊤Φ(l+1)b(l )
− Tr
[ ÛX⊤Φˆ(1)] − ∥Ψ∥1 − q ·∑
n
ηn −Q · ρ
and
Φ(L) = −c ∈ Rk
Φˆ(l ) = ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤ ∈ R |NL−l |×h(l ) for l = L − 1, ..., 1
Φ(l )nj =

0 if (n, j) ∈ I(l )−
Φˆnj if (n, j) ∈ I(l )+
S (l )nj
S (l )nj−R (l )nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
+
− Ω(l )nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
− if (n, j) ∈ I
(l )
for l = L − 1, ..., 2
Ψnd = max {∆nd − (ηn + ρ), 0}
∆nd =
[
Φˆ(1)nd
]
+
· (1 − ÛXnd ) +
[
Φˆ(1)nd
]
− ·
ÛXnd
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that parts of the dual
problem in Theorem 4.3 have a similar form to the problem in [20].
For instance, we can interpret this dual problem as a backward pass
on a GNN, where the Φˆ(l ) and Φ(l ) are the hidden representations
of the respective nodes in the graph. Crucially different, however,
is the propagation in the dual problem with the message passing
matrices ÛA coming from the GNN formulation where neighboring
nodes influence each other. Furthermore, our novel perturbation
constraints from Eq. (8) lead to the dual variables η and ρ, which
have their origin in the local (q) and global (Q) constraints, respec-
tively. Note that, in principle, our framework allows for different
budgets q per node. The term Ψ has its origin in the constraint
X˜nj ∈ [0, 1]. While on the first look, the above dual problem seems
rather complicated, its specific form makes it amenable for easy
optimization. The variables Ω,η, ρ have only simple, element-wise
constraints (e.g. clipping between [0, 1]). All other terms are just
deterministic assignments. Thus, straightforward optimization us-
ing (projected) gradient ascent in combination with any modern
automatic differentiation framework (e.g. TensorFlow, PyTorch) is
possible.
Furthermore, while in the above dual we need to optimize over
η and ρ, it turns out that we can simplify it even further: for any
feasible Ω, we get an optimal closed-form solution for η, ρ.
Theorem 4.4. Given the dual problem from Theorem 4.3 and any
dual-feasible value for Ω. For each node n ∈ NL−1, let Sn be the set
of dimensions d corresponding to the q largest values from the vector
∆n: (ties broken arbitrarily). Further, denote with on = mind ∈Sn ∆nd
the smallest of these values. The optimal ρ that maximizes the dual
is the Q-th largest value from [∆nd ]n∈NL−1,d ∈Sn . For later use we
denote with SQ the set of tuples (n,d) corresponding to theseQ-largest
values. Moreover, the optimal ηn is ηn = max {0,on − ρ}.
The proof is given in the appendix. Using Theo. 4.4, we obtain
an even more compact dual where we only have to optimize over
Ω. Importantly, the calculations done in Theo. 4.4 are also available
in many modern automatic differentiation frameworks (i.e. we can
back-propagate through them). Thus, we still get very efficient (and
easy to implement) optimization.
Default value: As mentioned before, it is not required to solve
the dual problem optimally. Any dual-feasible solution leads to a
lower bound on the original problem. Specifically, we can also just
evaluate the function дtq,Q once given a single instantiation for Ω.
This makes the computation of robustness certificates extremely
fast. For example, adopting the result of [20], instead of optimizing
over Ω we can set it to
Ω(l )nj = S
(l )
nj · (S
(l )
nj − R
(l )
nj )−1, (11)
which is dual-feasible, and still obtain strong robustness certificates.
In our experimental section, we compare the results obtained using
this default value to results for optimizing over Ω. Note that using
Theo. 4.4 we always ensure to use the optimal η, ρ w.r.t. Ω.
4.4 Primal Solutions and Certificates
Based on the above results, we can now prove the following:
Corollary 4.5. Eq. (9) is an integral linear program with respect
to the variables X˜ .
The proof is given in the appendix. Using this result, it is now
straightforward to prove Theo. 4.2 from the beginning.
Proof. Since Eq. (9) has an optimal (thus, feasible) solution
where X˜ is integral, we have X˜ ∈ Xˆq,Q ( ÛX ) and, thus, X˜ has to
be binary to be integral. Since in this case the L1 constraints are
equivalent to the L0 constraints, it follows that X˜ ∈ Xq,Q ( ÛX ). Thus,
this optimal solution of Eq. 9 is feasible for Eq. 7 as well. Together
withmˆt (y∗,y) ≤ m˜t (y∗,y) it follows thatmˆt (y∗,y) = m˜t (y∗,y). □
In the proof of Corollary 4.5, we have seen that in the optimal
solution, the set {(n,d) ∈ SQ | ∆nd > 0} =: P indicates those
elements which are perturbed. That is, we constructed the worst-
case perturbation. Clearly, this mechanism can also be used even if
Ω (and, thus, ∆) is not optimal: simply perturbing the elements in
P . In this case, of course, the primal solution might not be optimal
and we cannot use it for a robustness certificate. However, since the
resulting perturbation is primal feasible (regarding the setXq,Q ( ÛX )),
we can use it for our non-robustness certificate: After constructing
the perturbation X˜ based on P , we pass it through the exact GNN,
i.e. we evaluate Eq. (5). If the value is negative, we found a harmful
perturbation, certifying non-robustness.
In summary: By considering the dual program, we obtain ro-
bustness certificates if the obtained (dual) values are positive for
everyy , y∗. In contrast, by constructing the primal feasible pertur-
bation using P , we obtain non-robustness certificates if the obtained
(exact, primal) values are negative for one y , y∗. For some nodes,
neither of these certificates can be given. We analyze this aspect in
more detail in our experiments.
4.5 Activation Bounds
One crucial component of our method, the computation of the
bounds R(l ) and S(l ) on the activations in the relaxed GNN, remains
to be defined. Again, existing bounds for classical neural networks
are not applicable since they neither consider L0 constraints nor do
they take neighboring instances into account. Obtaining good upper
and lower bounds is crucial to obtain robustness certificates, as
tighter bounds lead to lower relaxation error of the GNN activations.
While in Sec. 4.3, we relax the discreteness condition of the node
attributes ÛX in the linear program, it turns out that for the bounds
the binary nature of the data can be exploited. More precisely, for
every nodem ∈ NL−2(t), we compute the upper bound S(2)mj in the
second layer for latent dimension j as
S(2)mj = sum_top_Q
(
[ ÛA(1)mn Sˆ(2)nji ]n∈N1(m),i ∈{1, ...,q }
)
+ ÛH (2)mj (12)
Sˆ(2)nji = i-th_largest
(
(1 − ÛXn:) ⊙
[
W (1):j
]
+
+ ÛXn: ⊙
[
W (1):j
]
−
)
Here, i-th_largest(·) denotes the selection of the i-th largest element
from the corresponding vector, and sum_top_Q(·) the sum of theQ
largest elements from the corresponding list. The first term of the
sum in Eq. (12) is an upper bound on the change/increase in the first
hidden layer’s activations of nodem and hidden dimension j for any
admissible perturbation on the attributes ÛX . The second term are
the hidden activations obtained for the (un-perturbed) input ÛX , i.e.
ÛH (2)mj = ÛA(1) ÛXW (1) + b(1). In sum we have an upper bound on the
hidden activations in the first hidden layer for the perturbed input
X˜ . Note that, reflecting the interdependence of nodes in the graph,
the bounds of a nodem depend on the attributes of its neighbors n.
Likewise for the lower bound we use:
R(2)mj = - sum_top_Q
(
[ ÛA(1)mnRˆ(2)nji ]n∈N1(m),i ∈{1, ...,q }
)
+ ÛH (2)mj (13)
Rˆ(2)nji = i-th_largest
( ÛXn: ⊙ [W (1):j ]+ + (1 − ÛXn:) ⊙ [W (1):j ]−)
We need to compute the bounds for each node in the L − 2 hop
neighborhood of the target, i.e. for a GNN with a single hidden
layer (L = 3) we have R(2), S(2) ∈ RN1(t )×h(2) .
Corollary 4.6. Eqs. (12) and (13) are valid, and the tightest pos-
sible, lower/upper bounds w.r.t. the set of admissible perturbations.
The proof is in the appendix. For the remaining layers, since the
input to them is no longer binary, we adapt the bounds proposed
in [18]. Generalized to the GNN we therefore obtain:
R(l ) = ÛA(l−1)
(
R(l−1)
[
W (l−1)
]
+
− S(l−1)
[
W (l−1)
]
−
)
S(l ) = ÛA(l−1)
(
S(l−1)
[
W (l−1)
]
+
− R(l−1)
[
W (l−1)
]
−
)
for l = 3, . . . ,L − 1.
Intuitively, for the upper bounds we assume that the activations
in the previous layer take their respective upper bound wherever
we have positive weights, and their lower bounds whenever we
have negative weights (and the lower bounds are analogous to this).
While there exist more computationally involved algorithms to
compute more accurate bounds [20], we leave adaptation of such
bounds to the graph domain for future work.
It is important to note that all bounds can be computed highly
efficiently and one can even back-propagate through them – im-
portant aspects for the robust training (Sec. 5). Specifically, one can
compute Eqs. (12) and (13) for allm ∈ V (!) and all j together in time
O(h(2) · (N ·D +E ·q)) where E is the number of edges in the graph.
Note that Rˆ(2)nj : can be computed in time O(D) by unordered partial
sorting; overall leading to the complexity O(N · h(2) · D). Likewise
the sum of top Q elements can be computed in time O(N1(m) · q)
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ h(2) andm ∈ V , together leading to O(E ·q ·h(2)).
5 ROBUST TRAINING OF GNNS
While being able to certify robustness of a given GNN by itself is
extremely valuable for being able to trust the model’s output in
real-world applications, it is also highly desirable to train classifiers
that are (certifiably) robust to adversarial attacks. In this section we
show how to use our findings from before to train robust GNNs.
Recall that the value of the dual д can be interpreted as a lower
bound on the margin between the two considered classes. As a
shortcut, we denote withptθ (y,Ω(·)) =
[
−дtq,Q
( ÛX ,ck ,Ωk )]
1≤k≤K
the K-dimensional vector containing the (negative) dual objective
function values for any class k compared to the given class y, i.e.
ck = ey − ek . That is, node t with class y∗t is certifiably robust if
ptθ < 0 for all entries (except the entry at y
∗
t which is always 0).
Here, θ denotes the parameters of the GNN.
First consider the training objective typically used to train GNNs
for node classification:
minimize
θ
∑
t ∈VL
L
(
f tθ ( ÛX , ÛA),y∗t
)
, (14)
where L is the cross entropy function (operating on the logits) and
VL the set of labeled nodes in the graph. y∗t denotes the (known)
class label of node t . To improve robustness, in [20] (for classical
neural networks) it has been proposed to instead optimize
minimize
θ,
{
Ωt,k
}
t∈VL ,1≤k≤K
∑
t ∈VL
L
(
ptθ (y∗t ,Ωt, ·),y∗t
)
(15)
which is an upper bound on the worst-case loss achievable. Note
that we can omit optimizing over Ω by setting it to Eq. (11). We
refer to the loss function in Eq. (15) as robust cross entropy loss.
One common issue with deep learning models is overconfidence
[14], i.e. the models predicting effectively a probability of 1 for one
and 0 for the other classes. Applied to Eq. (15), this means that
the vector ptθ is pushed to contain very large negative numbers:
the predictions will not only be robust but also very certain even
under the worst perturbation. To facilitate true robustness and not
false certainty in our model’s predictions, we therefore propose an
alternative robust loss that we refer to as robust hinge loss:
LˆM
(
p,y∗
)
=
∑
k,y∗
max {0,pk +M} . (16)
This loss is positive if −ptθk = дtq,Q
( ÛX ,ck ,Ωk ) < M ; and zero
otherwise. Put simply: If the loss is zero, the node t is certifiably
robust – in this case even guaranteeing a margin of at least M to
the decision boundary. Importantly, realizing even larger margins
(for the worst-case) is not ‘rewarded’.
We combine the robust hinge loss with standard cross entropy to
obtain the following robust optimization problem
min
θ,Ω
∑
t ∈VL
LˆM
(
ptθ (y∗t ,Ωt, ·),y∗t
)
+ L
(
f tθ ( ÛX , ÛA),y∗t
)
. (17)
Note that the cross entropy term is operating on the exact, non-
relaxed GNN, which is a strong advantage over the robust cross
entropy loss that only uses the relaxed GNN. Thus, we are using
the exact GNN model for the node predictions, while the relaxed
GNN is only used to ensure robustness. Effectively, if all nodes are
robust, the term LˆM becomes zero, thus, reducing to the standard
cross-entropy loss on the exact GNN (with robustness guarantee).
Robustness in the semi-supervised setting:While Eq. (17) im-
proves the robustness regarding the labeled nodes, we do not con-
sider the given unlabeled nodes. How to handle the semi-supervised
setting which is prevalent in the graph domain, ensuring also ro-
bustness for the unlabeled nodes? Note that for the unlabeled nodes,
we do not necessarily want robustness certificates with a very large
margin (i.e. strongly negative ptθ ) since the classifier’s prediction
may be wrong in the first place; this would mean that we encour-
age the classifier to make very certain predictions even when the
predictions are wrong. Instead, we want to reflect in our model that
some unlabeled nodes might be close to the decision boundary and
not make overconfident predictions in these cases.
Our robust hinge loss provides a natural way to incorporate these
goals. By setting a smaller marginM2 for the unlabeled nodes, we
can train our classifier to be robust, but does not encourage worst-
case logit differences larger than the specifiedM2. Importantly, this
does not mean that the classifier will be less certain in general, since
the cross entropy term is unchanged and if the classifier is already
robust, the robust hinge loss is 0. Overall:
min
θ,Ω
∑
t ∈VL
LˆM1
(
ptθ (y∗t ,Ωt, ·),y∗t
)
+ L
(
f tθ ( ÛX , ÛA),y∗t
)
(18)
+
∑
t ∈V\VL
LˆM2
(
ptθ (y˜t ,Ωt, ·), y˜t
)
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Figure 1: Certificates for a GNN trained
with standard training on Cora-ML.
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relates with robustness.
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Figure 3: Robustness of nodes vs.
their degree.
where y˜t = argmaxk f tθ ( ÛX , ÛA)k is the predicted label for node t .
Note again that the unlabeled nodes are used for robustness pur-
poses only – making it very different to the principle of self-training
(see below). Overall, Eq. (18) aims to correctly classify all labeled
nodes using the exact GNN, while making sure that every node has
at least a margin of M∗ from the decision boundary even under
worst-case perturbations.
Eq. (18) can be optimized as is. In practice, however, we proceed
as follows:We first train the GNN on the labeled nodes using Eq. (17)
until convergence. Then we train on all nodes using Eq. (18) until
convergence.
Discussion: Note that the above idea is not applicable to the
robust cross entropy loss from Eq. (15). One might argue that one
could use a GNN trained using Eq. (15) to compute predictions for
all (or some of the) unlabeled nodes. Then, treating these predictions
as the correct (soft-)labels for the nodes and recursively apply the
training. This has two undesired effects: If the prediction is very
uncertain (i.e. the soft-labels are flat), Eq. (15) tries to find a GNN
where the worst-case margin exactly matches these uncertain labels
(since this minimizes the cross-entropy). The GNN will be forced to
keep the prediction uncertain for such instances even if it could do
better. On the other hand, if the prediction is very certain (i.e. very
peaky), Eq. (15) tries to make sure that even in the worst-case the
prediction has such high certainty – thus being overconfident in the
prediction (which might even be wrong in the first place). Indeed,
this case mimics the idea of self-training: In self-training, we first
train our model on the labeled nodes. Subsequently, we use the
predicted classes of (some of) the unlabeled nodes, pretending these
are their true labels; and continue training with them as well. Self-
training, however, serves an orthogonal purpose and, in principle,
can be used with any of the above models.
Summary:When training the GNN, the lower and upper activa-
tion bounds are treated as a function of θ , i.e. they are updated ac-
cordingly. While this can be done efficiently as discussed in Sec. 4.5,
it is still the least efficient part of our model and future work might
consider incremental computations. Overall, since the dual pro-
gram in Theorem 4.3 and the upper/lower activations bounds are
differentiable, we can train a robust GNN with gradient descent
and standard deep learning libraries. Note again that by setting Ω
to its default value, we actually only have to optimize over θ – like
in standard training. Furthermore, computing ptθ for the default
parameters has roughly the same cost as evaluating a usual (sliced)
GNN K many times, i.e. it is very efficient.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experimental contributions are twofold. (i) We evaluate the
robustness of traditionally trained GNNs using, and thus analyz-
ing, our certification method. (ii) We show that our robust training
procedure can dramatically improve GNNs’ robustness while sacri-
ficing only minimal accuracy on the unlabeled nodes.
We evaluate our method on the widely used and publicly avail-
able datasets Cora-ML (N=2,995, E=8,416, D=2,879, K=7) [16], Cite-
seer (N=3,312, E=4,715, D=3,703, K=6) [19], and PubMed (N=19,717,
E=44,324, D=500, K=3) [19]. For every dataset, we allow local (i.e.
per-node) changes to the node attributes amounting to 1% of the
attribute dimension, i.e. q = 0.01D. Q is analyzed in detail in the
experiments reflecting different perturbation spaces.
We refer to the traditional training of GNNs as Cross Entropy
(short CE), to the robust variant of cross entropy as Robust Cross
Entropy (RCE), and to our hinge loss variants as Robust Hinge Loss
(RH) and Robust Hinge Loss with Unlabeled (RH-U), where the latter
enforces a margin loss also on the unlabeled nodes. We set M1,
i.e. the margin on the training nodes to log(0.9/0.1) and M2 to
log(0.6/0.4) for the unlabeled nodes (RH-U only). This means that
we train the GNN to (correctly) classify the labeled nodes with
output probability of 90% in the worst case, and the unlabeled nodes
with 60%, reflecting that we do not want our model to be overcon-
fident on the unlabeled nodes. Please note that we do not need to
compare against graph adversarial attack models such as [21] since
our method gives provable guarantees on the robustness.
While our method can be used for any GNN of the form in
Eq. (1), we study the well-established GCN [12], which has shown
to outperform many more complicated models. Following [12], we
consider GCNs with one hidden layer (i.e. L = 3), and choose a
latent dimensionality of 32. We split the datasets into 10% labeled
and 90% unlabeled nodes. See the appendix for further details.
6.1 Certificates: Robustness of GNNs
We first start to investigate our (non-)robustness certificates by ana-
lyzing GNNs trained using standard cross entropy training. Figure 1
shows the main result: for varying Q we report the percentage of
nodes (train+test) which are certifiable robust/non-robust on Cora-
ML. We can make two important observations: (i) Our certificates
are often very tight. That is, the white area (nodes for which we
cannot give any – robustness or non-robustness – certificate) is
rather small. Indeed, for any givenQ , at most 30% of the nodes can-
not be certified across all datasets and despite no robust training,
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Figure 4: Robust training (Cora-ML).
Dashed lines are w/o robust training.
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Figure 5: Robust training (Citeseer).
Dashed lines are w/o robust training.
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Figure 6: RH-U is most successful for
robustness at Q = 12 (Cora-ML).
highlighting the tightness of our bounds and relaxations and the
effectiveness of our certification method. (ii) GNNs trained tradi-
tionally are only certifiably robust up to very small perturbations.
At Q = 12, less than 55% of the nodes are certifiably robust on
Cora-ML. In case of Citeseer even less than 20% (Table 1; training:
CE). Even worse, at this point already two thirds (for Citeseer) and
a quarter (Cora-ML) of the nodes are certifiably non-robust (i.e. we
can find adversarial examples), confirming the issues reported in
[21]. PubMed behaves similarly (as we will see later, e.g., in Table 1).
In our experiments, the labeled nodes are on average more robust
than the unlabeled nodes, which is not surprising given that the
classifier was not trained using the labels of the latter.
We also investigate what contributes to certain nodes being more
robust than others. In Figure 2 we see that neighborhood purity (i.e.
the share of nodes in a respective node’s two-hop neighborhood
that is assigned the same class by the classifier) plays an important
role. OnCora-ML, almost all nodes that are certifiably robust above
Q ≥ 50 have a neighborhood purity of at least 80%. When analyzing
the degree (Figure 3), it seems that nodes with a medium degree are
most robust. While counterintuitive at first, having many neighbors
also means a large surface for adversarial attacks. Nodes with low
degree, in contrast, might be affected more strongly since each node
in its neighborhood has a larger influence.
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Tightness of lower bounds:
Next, we aim to analyze how tight
our dual lower bounds are, which
we needed to obtain efficient cer-
tification. For this, we analyze
(i) the value of дq,Q (·) we ob-
tain from our dual solution (either
when optimizing overΩ are using
the default value), compared to (ii)
the value of the primal solution
we obtain using our construction
from Sec. 4.4. The smaller the difference, the better. As seen in
Figure 7, when optimizing over Ω, for most of the nodes the gap is
0. Thus, indeed we can often find the exact minimum of the primal
via the dual. As expected, when using the default value for Ω the
difference between dual and primal is larger. Still, for most nodes
the difference is small. Indeed, and more importantly, when consid-
ering the actual certificates (where we only need to verify whether
the dual is positive; its actual value is not important), the difference
between optimizing Ω and its default value become negligible: on
Cora-ML, the average maximal Q for which we can certify robust-
ness drops by 0.54; Citeseer 0.18; PubMed 2.3. This highlights that
we can use the default values of Ω to very efficiently certify many
or even all nodes in a GNN. In all remaining experiments we, thus,
only operate with this default choice.
6.2 Robust Training of GNNs
Next, we analyze our robust training procedure. If not mentioned
otherwise, we use our robust hinge-loss including the unlabeled
nodes RH-U and we robustify the models with Q = 12 since for
this value more than 50% of nodes across our datasets were not
certifiably robust (when using standard training).
Figure 4 and 5 show again the percentage of certified nodes
w.r.t. a certain Q – now when using a robustly trained GCN. With
dotted lines, we have plotted the curves one obtains for the standard
(non-robust) training – e.g. the dotted lines in Fig. 4 are the ones
already seen in Fig. 1. As it becomes clear, with robust training, we
can dramatically increase the number of nodes which are robust.
Almost every node is robust when considering the Q for which
the model has been trained for. E.g. for Citeseer, our method is
able to quadruple the number of certifiable nodes for Q = 12. Put
simply: When performing an adversarial attack withQ ≤ 12 on this
model, it cannot do any harm! Moreover the share of nodes that
can be certified for any given Q has increased significantly (even
thoughwe have not trained themodel forQ > 12). Most remarkably,
nodes for which we certified non-robustness before become now
certifiably robust (the blue region above the gray lines).
Accuracy: The increased robustness comes at almost no loss in
classification accuracy as Table 1 shows. There we report the results
for all datasets and all training principles. The last two columns
show the accuracy obtained for node classification (for train and
test nodes separately). In some cases, our robust classifiers even
outperform the non-robust one on the unlabeled nodes. Interest-
ingly, for PubMed we see that the accuracy on the labeled nodes
drops to the accuracy on the unlabeled nodes. This indicates that
our method can even improve generalization.
Training principles: Comparing the different robust training
procedures (also given in more detail in Figure 6), we see that RH-U
achieves significantly higher robustness when considering Q = 12.
This is shown by the third-last column in the table, where the
percentage of nodes which are certifiably robust forQ = 12 (i.e. the
Q the models have been robustified for) is shown. The third column
shows the largest Q for which a node is still certifiably robust
(averaged over all nodes). As shown, for all training principles the
average exceeds the value of 12.
Effect of training with Q : If we strongly increase the Q for
which the classifier is trained for, we only observe a small drop in
Dataset Training Avg. MaxQ robust
% Robust
Q = 12
Acc.
(labeled)
Acc.
(unlabeled)
Ci
te
se
er CE 6.77 0.17 1.00 0.67RCE 18.62 0.58 0.99 0.69
RH 15.51 0.54 0.99 0.68
RH-U 18.48 0.76 0.99 0.68
Co
ra
-M
L CE 16.36 0.54 1.00 0.83
RCE 38.58 0.77 1.00 0.83
RH 32.49 0.74 1.00 0.83
RH-U 35.58 0.91 1.00 0.83
Pu
bM
ed
CE 5.82 0.15 0.99 0.86
RCE 50.68 0.62 0.88 0.84
RH 48.56 0.62 0.90 0.85
RH-U 47.56 0.63 0.90 0.86
Table 1: Robust training results. Our robust trainingmethods significantly im-
prove the robustness of GNNs while not sacrificing accuracy. Robust training
was done for Q = 12. Results are averaged over five random data splits.
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Figure 9: Robust training, diff. Q
the classification accuracy. E.g., training accuracy drops from 99% to
87% when going fromQ = 12 to 48, while test accuracy stays almost
unchanged (68% vs. 66%) on Citeseer. We attribute this to the fact
that the GNN still uses the normal CE loss in addition to our robust
hinge loss during training. Figure 9 shows the results for Corawhere
we trained three models with different Q . To clarify: We have to
distinguish between the Q used for training a model (mentioned in
the legend) and theQ we are computing certificates for (the x-axis).
We see: (i) Clearly, all trainings lead to significantly more robust
models. Though, the larger Q , the harder it gets. (ii) Importantly,
each model is the ‘winner in robustness’ when considering the Q
for which the model has been trained for.
Training Dynamics: Lastly, we analyze the behavior when
training a GCN using either standard training or robust training
with RH-U. In Figure 8 we monitor the worst-case margin (averaged
over a minibatch of nodes; separately for the labeled and unlabeled
nodes) obtained in each training iteration. As seen, with RH-U the
worst-case margin increases to the specified values M1/M2 – i.e.
making them robust. In contrast, for standard training the worst-
case margin decreases. Specifically the unlabeled nodes (which ac-
count to 90% of all nodes) are not robust.
Overall, all experiments show that our robust training is highly
effective: robustness is increased while the accuracy is still high.
7 CONCLUSION
We proposed the first work on certifying robustness of GNNs, con-
sidering perturbations of the node attributes under a challenging
L0 perturbation budget and tackling the discrete data domain. By
relaxing the GNN and considering the dual, we realized an efficient
computation of our certificates – simultaneously our experiments
have shown that our certificates are tight since for most nodes a
certificate can be given. We have shown that traditional training
of GNNs leads to non-robust models that can easily be fooled. In
contrast, using our novel (semi-supervised) robust training the re-
sulting GNNs are shown to bemuchmore robust. All this is achieved
with only a minor effect on the classification accuracy. As future
work we aim to consider perturbations of the graph structure.
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8 APPENDIX
Implementation Details:We perform the robust training using
stochastic gradient descent with mini-batches and Adam Optimizer.
For this we randomly sample in each iteration 20 nodes from the
labeled nodes (for RH-U from all nodes) and compute the nodes’
twohop neighbors. We then slice the adjacency and attribute matri-
ces appropriately and compute the lower/upper activation bounds
for all nodes in the batch. We use dropout of 0.5, L2 regularization
with strength 1e − 5, learning rate of 0.001. We use Tensorflow 1.12
and train on NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti.
8.1 Proofs
We reformulate the problem in Eq. (9) as the linear program below.
minimize
X˜ ,H (·),Hˆ (·), εˆ
c⊤Hˆ (L)subject to (19)
Hˆ
(l+1)
= ÛA(l )H (l )W (l ) + b(l ), l = 2, . . . ,L ⇒ Φ(l+1) ∈ RNL−l×h(l )
H (1)nj ≤ 1 ⇒ ε+ ∈ RNL−1×h
(1)
H (1)nj ≥ 0 ⇒ ε− ∈ RNL−1×h
(1)
H (1)nj ≤ ÛXnj + εˆnj ⇒ γ+ ∈ RNL−1×h
(1)
H (1)nj ≥ ÛXnj − εˆnj ⇒ γ− ∈ RNL−1×h
(1)∑
j
εˆnj ≤ q ∀n ∈ NL−1 ⇒ η ∈ RNL−1∑
n, j
εˆnj ≤ Q ⇒ ρ ∈ R
H (l )nj = 0, l = 2, . . . ,L − 1, (n, j) ∈ I(l )−
H (l )nj = Hˆ
(l )
nj , l = 2, . . . ,L − 1, (n, j) ∈ I(l )+
H (l )nj ≥ 0, l = 2, . . . ,L − 1, (n, j) ∈ I(l ) ⇒ τ (l ) ∈ RNL−l×h
(l )
H (l )nj ≥ Hˆ
(l )
, l = 2, . . . ,L − 1, (n, j) ∈ I(l ) ⇒ µ(l ) ∈ RNL−l×h(l )
H (l )nj
(
S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj
)
≤ S(l )nj
(
Hˆ
(l )
nj − R(l )nj
)
, ⇒ λ(l ) ∈ RNL−l×h(l )
l = 2, . . . ,L − 1, (n, j) ∈ I(l )
Note that X˜ = H (1); moreover the H (l )nj = 0 and H
(l )
nj = Hˆ
(l ) can
be simply eliminated from the optimization. λ, µ, and τ are only
defined for (n, j) ∈I(l ); we keep the matrix notation for simplicity.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Applying standard duality construction,
the (non-simplified!) dual problem of the above linear program is
max
L−1∑
l=2
∑
(n, j)∈I(l )
λ
(l )
njS
(l )
njR
(l )
nj −
L−1∑
l=1
1⊤Φ(l+1)b(l )
+
∑
n, j
ÛXnj
[
γ−nj − γ+nj
]
− ε+ − q
∑
n
ηn −Qρ subject to
Φ(L) = −c Φ(l )nj = 0 for l = 2, . . . L, (n, j) ∈ I(l )−
Φ(l ) = ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤, for l = 2, . . . L, (n, j) ∈ I(l )+
Φ(l )nj = λnjS
(l )
nj − µ
(l )
nj for l = 2, . . . L, (n, j) ∈ I(l )
ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤ = λ(l ) ⊙
[
S(l ) − R(l )
]
− τ (l ) − µ(l ) for l = 2, . . . L, (n, j) ∈ I(l )
ÛA(1)⊤Φ(2)W (1)⊤ = ε+ − ε− + γ+ − γ− (20)
ρ + ηn ≥ γ+nj + γ−nj ∀n, j (21)
λ,τ , µ,ε+, ε−,γ+,γ−,η, ρ ≥ 0
As done in [20] we can exploit complementarity of the ReLU con-
straints corresponding to H (l ) ≥ 0 and H (l ) ≥ Hˆ (l ) to eliminate τ ,
µ, and λ from the problem. For this we write[
S(l ) − R(l )
]
⊙ λ(l ) =
[ ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤]
+
=
[
Φˆ(l )
]
+
τ (l ) + µ(l ) =
[ ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤]− = [Φˆ(l )]−
where we have defined Φˆ(l ) := ÛA(l )⊤Φ(l+1)W (l )⊤. Given the non-
negativity of the dual-variables, it becomes apparent that τ (l ) and
µ(l ) “share” the negative part of Φˆ(l ). Thus, we define new variables
Ω(l )nj ∈ [0, 1] such that µ
(l )
nj = Ω
(l )
nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
−. Combining this with the
constraint Φ(l )nj = λnjS
(l )
nj − µ
(l )
nj we can rephrase to get
Φ(l )nj =
S(l )nj
S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
+
− Ω(l )nj
[
Φˆ(l )nj
]
−
λ
(l )
nd =
[
Φˆ(l )nd
]
+
· (S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj )
−1
Similarly, by complementarity of the constraints, we know that
only one of ε+nj and ε
−
nj and only one of γ
+
nj and γ
−
nj can be positive.
From Eq. (20) we can therefore see that ε+nj and γ
+
nj need to “share”
the positive part of the left hand side in Eq. (20) (since all variables
are ≥ 0); similarly ε−nj and γ−nj share the negative part. We denote
this (unknown) share by a new variable βnj ∈ [0, 1] and get
ε+nj = βnj
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
+
, γ+nj = (1 − βnj )
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
+
ε−nj = βnj
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
− , γ
−
nj = (1 − βnj )
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
−
Putting this into Eq. (21) we can now see that
ηn + ρ ≥ (1 − βnj )|Φˆ(1)nj | ∀1 ≤ n ≤ NL−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ h(1),
from which we can get
βnj ≥ 1 − ρ + ηn
|Φˆ(1)nj |
, βnj ≥ 0 ∀n, j (22)
to replace the constraint in Eq. (21). Now we can simplify the fol-
lowing term from the dual objective
ÛXnj
[
γ−nj − γ+nj
]
− ε+nj = −Φˆ(1)nj ÛXnj + βnj Φˆ(1)nj ÛXnj − βnj
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
+
= −Φˆ(l )nj ÛXnj − ∆njβnj where
∆nj :=
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
+
· (1 − ÛXnd ) +
[
Φˆ(1)nj
]
− ·
ÛXnd .
In the definition of∆nj we essentially have a case distinction: if Φˆ(1)nj
is positive, we know that increasing the value of the corresponding
primal variable X˜nd will improve the primal objective. If ÛXnd is
already 1, however, we set the value of ∆nj to zero by multiplying
by 1 − ÛXnd (similarly for the case when Φˆ(1)nj is negative). This
effectively enforces the 0 ≤ X˜ ≤ 1 constraint on the perturbations.
Plugging all terms defined above into our dual objective we get
max
L−1∑
l=2
∑
(n, j)∈I(l )
S(l )njR
(l )
nj
S(l )nj − R
(l )
nj
[
Φˆ(l+1)nj
]
+
−
L−1∑
l=1
1⊤Φ(l+1)b(l )
− Tr
[ ÛX⊤Φˆ(1)] − ∥∆ ⊙ β ∥1 − q ·∑
n
ηn −Q · ρ
Notice that Tr
[ ÛX⊤Φˆ(1)] = ∑n ∑j Φˆnj ÛXnj . Since ∆ ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0
we could safely write ∥∆ ⊙ β ∥1. By observing that ∆ ≥ 0 for all
entries we see that to maximize the objective, we will set β to
a value as small as is admissible. This means we can replace Eq.
(22) with β = max
{
1 − ρ+ηn|Φˆ(1)nj |
, 0
}
. Thus, we have now eliminated
all dual variables except Ω, ρ, and ηn . Finally, we define Ψnj :=
∆njβnj = max
{
∆nj − (ηn + ρ), 0
}
, which finalizes the proof. □
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Given a fixed Ω, the dual function дtq,Q
reduces to −∥Ψ∥1 − q ·∑n ηn −Q · ρ + const with the term Ψnd =
max {∆nd − (ηn + ρ), 0} and ∆nd constant. Noticing that Ψnd ≥ 0,
we see that maximizing the dual is equivalent to minimizing
min
ρ,ηn ≥0
h(ρ,ηn ) =
∑
n,d
max {∆nd − (ηn + ρ), 0} + q ·
∑
n
ηn +Q · ρ
Observe that we can equivalently rephrase this as
min
ρ,ηn,Und ≥0
h′(ρ,ηn ,U ) =
∑
n,d
Und + q ·
∑
n
ηn +Q · ρ
s .t . Und ≥ ∆nd − ηn − ρ
Herewe have replacedmax{∆nd−(ηn+ρ), 0} inh(ρ,ηn )with a new
variableUnd with the constraintsUnd ≥ 0 andUnd ≥ ∆nd −ηn −ρ
(for each 1 ≤ n ≤ NL−1, 1 ≤ d ≤ h(1)). Since we are minimizing,
the optimal values w.r.t. h′(ρ,ηn ,U ) and h(ρ,ηn ) will be the same.
Finding the minimum of h′(·) is a linear program. Thus, we can
again form its dual (denoting the dual variables as αnd ):
max
αnd ≥0
д′(αnd ) =
∑
n,d
∆ndαnd
s .t . αnd ≤ 1,
∑
n,d
αnd ≤ Q,
∑
d
αnd ≤ q ∀n
An optimal solution of this dual can be seen and computed easily.
Since all ∆nd are nonnegative, we simply set those αnd to 1 corre-
sponding to the largest values of ∆nd – additionally taking the two
other constraints into account: The third constraint tells us that
the row sums of the α matrix can be at most q, hence we can only
set the αnd corresponding to the q largest ∆nd to 1 for each row
to maximize the objective. The second constraint means that we
can set at most Q entries αnd to 1. So among the set of all q largest
∆nd of the rows we select again the Q largest ∆nd and set their
corresponding αnd to 14. Observe that this is precisely the selection
process described in the main text for Thm. 4.4. That is, an optimal
solution of the dual can be found by setting αnd = 1⇔ (n,d) ∈ SQ .
We now prove that the variables ρ and ηn as described in the
main text (along withUnd = max{∆nd −ηn − ρ, 0}) correspond to
an optimal solution of their respective problem. For this we show
that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions hold – using the
above constructed solution for αnd . (1) Dual and primal feasibility
hold by construction. (2) Next, we check complementary slackness
αnd (∆nd − ηn − ρ −Und ) = 0 (23)
If αnd > 0 it must hold that the second term is 0. In this case we
know that ∆nd ≥ ηn + ρ and thus Und = ∆nd − ηn − ρ, which
means the term is always 0. When the second term in Eq. (23) is
nonzero, αnd must be 0. This is given since when ∆nd < ηn +
ρ +Und it is smaller than the smallest ∆nd for which αnd is set
to 1 and therefore αnd = 0. (3) Finally we show that ∇θL(θ ,α) =
∇θ
∑
n,d Und+q·
∑
n ηn+Q ·ρ+
∑
n,d αnd (∆nd−ηn−ρ−Und ) = 0 for
θ = {Und ,ηn , ρ}. Consider first ρ: ∇ρL(θ ,α) = Q −
∑
n,d αnd = 0
since we set exactlyQ many αnd to 1 (and the rest to 0); ηn follows
analogously. ∇Und L(θ ,α) = IUnd>0(1 − αnd ) = 0 holds since when
αnd = 0,∆nd −ηn−ρ ≤ 0which means thatUnd must be 0 because
of its constraints. Thus, all KKT conditions hold. □
Proof of Corollary 4.5. Assume we are given the optimal val-
ues for Ω. We can then compute the optimal values of ρ and η as
described in Theorem 4.4. Recall from the proof of Thm. 4.3 that the
∆nd denote the improvement in the primal function objective when
changing the attribute ÛXnd . As shown in the proof of Thm. 4.4 with
the optimal αnd we exactly choose the values ∆nd that lead to the
largest improvement of the objective function – and we trivially
observed αnd = 1 for those elements. Thus, an optimal solution can
be obtained by perturbing the attribute entries ÛXnd from the set
P := {(n,d)|αnd = 1,∆nd > 0}, i.e. setting them to 1 − ÛXnd . Thus,
by construction we found an optimal solution which is integral,
making the original linear program integral w.r.t. the attributes X˜nd .
By construction of αnd the set P = {(n,d) ∈ SQ | ∆nd > 0}. □
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Using Eq. (3), the (un-perturbed) Hˆ (2)mj
is ÛA(1)m: ÛXW (1):j +b(1)j =
∑
n
∑
d ÛA(1)mn ÛXndW (1)d j +b
(1)
j which is simply
a linear sum in ÛXnd . Clearly, for maximizing Hˆ (2)mj , one should only
perturb ÛXnd if ( ÛA(1)mnW (1)d j is positive and ÛXnd = 0) or ( ÛA
(1)
mnW
(1)
d j is
negative and ÛXnd = 1). Thus, the maximal increase of Hˆ (2)mj based
on ÛXnd one can achieve is ÛA(1)mn ·W (1)d j if the first condition holds,
− ÛA(1)mn ·W (1)d j if the second holds, and 0 else. This can compactly
be written as ÛA(1)mn · ([W (1)d j ]+ · (1 − ÛXnd ) + [W
(1)
d j ]− · ÛXnd ) , which
matches the terms in Eq. (12). To obtain the maximal overall in-
crease in Hˆ (2)mj , and, thus, an upper bound, one simply picks the
largest elements that still adhere to the budget constraints (Q,q). Ob-
viously, since this is an admissible perturbation, this upper bound
is tight. The proof for the lower bound is accordingly. □
4W.l.o.g. we assume Q ≤ |NL−1 | · q here; otherwise we simply select all of the q
largest ∆nd per row (which is equivalent to choosing Q = |NL−1 | · q)
